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Disclosure Incentives, Mandatory Standards and Firm Communication in the
IFRS Adoption Setting

Abstract:
We investigate the content, timing and relevance of firms’ narrative disclosure about
the effects of IFRS adoption in annual statutory financial statements and firm
announcements to the stock exchange for 150 large listed Australian firms in the
three year period surrounding adoption (which occurred from 1 January 2005). We
observe communication about changes in financial reports, even when the change
relates to accounting rather than economic events. We record more disclosure by
firms experiencing an adverse change in earnings, consistent with them being
sensitive to signals about future earnings. When economic performance is stronger,
firms provide less discussion of the accounting effects of IFRS. We also find the
discussion of IFRS impact in both disclosure channels is value relevant for firms
with relatively higher levels of disclosure, providing evidence of the usefulness of
transition disclosures.

JEL classification: M40, M41
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Disclosure Incentives, Mandatory Standards and Firm Communication in the
IFRS Adoption Setting

1.

Introduction

We investigate the disclosures made by 150 Australian listed firms during the three
year period surrounding adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) (from 1 January 2005). We make use of a specific capital market and
financial reporting event, namely the adoption of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS), to examine the interaction of disclosure incentives arising from the
institutional setting for financial reporting and those that can be linked to managers’
incentives. The Australian institutional setting includes legally enforceable
accounting standards with specific disclosure requirements, listing rules including the
continuous disclosure requirements of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and
scrutiny by independent auditors and regulators, all of which can be expected to
promote compliance and disclosure.

Nevertheless, the way firms respond to the mandatory requirements and the
institutional setting will vary, reflecting their particular business and economic
circumstances together with managers’ incentives. On adoption of IFRS, firms had
strong incentives to keep investors, analysts and other stakeholders informed during
the transition process, to ensure the change to IFRS did not erroneously affect
perceptions of a firm’s prospects (Ernst and Young, 2003; Accountnet, 2004).
However, disclosure also reflects managers’ assessments of the costs and benefits of
disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001), including such considerations as the perceived
information value or usefulness to market participants.

The research questions we consider are as follows: What are the attributes and timing
of firms’ IFRS disclosures? To what extent do firms experiencing greater financial
impact on earnings and equity from IFRS adoption provide more disclosure about the
IFRS effects, given that IFRS is an accounting change, not a change in economic
fundamentals? Do firms experiencing a larger negative impact on earnings and
equity provide earlier disclosure and do they make greater use of more disclosure
channels? Finally, is firm disclosure about IFRS impact beneficial, that is, is it value
relevant for market participants?
2

We find disclosure about the impact of IFRS increases over the three year period of
our study, becoming more quantified in the adoption year as firms are better able to
measure the impact of IFRS. On average, firms provide more disclosure about
financial position, consistent with explaining IFRS effects on assets, liabilities and
equity that carry forward and affect future financial ratios. Some firms made use of
firm announcements to the ASX to communicate IFRS effects and there is more
discussion of IFRS in the transition year compared to the adoption year. Firm
announcements with discussion of IFRS effects were largely made after the financial
year end date as part of the firm’s earnings announcement.
We extend prior IFRS disclosure studies (Gallery et al. 2008; Kent and Stewart 2008;
Palmer 2008) by considering a three year period, disclosure in financial statements
and firm announcements to the ASX in 2005 and 2006, and several measures of
disclosure (total, performance, position, qualitative, quantitative, and key impact
items). We show that firm disclosure about the impact of IFRS on financial position
and performance is associated with the change in earnings on transition (an
accounting change) and the change in earnings in the first year of use of IFRS (an
economic change).

Consistent with studies showing managers are sensitive to the nature of the news to
be explained (Bloomfield 2008; Brown and Tucker, 2010; Matsumoto et al., 2011),
we find disclosure about IFRS impact is linked to firm incentives to explain financial
position and performance. For firms with ‘bad news’, that is firms that experience a
fall in earnings in the adoption year, disclosure about IFRS effects in financial
statements increases as the IFRS financial impact on earnings and equity is larger.
Firm with ‘good news’ have relatively less incentive to provide explanations about
IFRS effects. The relation between disclosure and IFRS impact is weaker for ‘good
news’ firms and we find some evidence of less disclosure by firms experiencing a
larger positive financial impact. The results suggest firms with poorer performance
make relatively more use of disclosure about IFRS effects as they explain their
results.

We also consider whether the disclosure provided is value relevant. Using models
derived from Ohlson (1995), we examine the association between share price, book
3

value of equity and earnings with IFRS impact disclosure. The latter includes both
measures of the financial effect (the amount of difference between earnings and
equity under AGAAP and IFRS) and measures of firm narrative disclosure about the
impact.

By measuring disclosure in the adoption period, our results add to existing literature
on the value relevance of IFRS compared to AGAAP (Goodwin et al. 2008; Clarkson
et al. 2011; Chalmers et al. 2011). Goodwin et al. (2008) report that transition
differences in earnings and equity are not value relevant in Australian firms.
However, we find that the difference in earnings is value relevant in the transition
year for firms providing more than the average disclosure about the impact of IFRS
transition. Our results suggest beneficial effects for firms providing more detailed
explanations of IFRS impact and confirm that transition disclosures have economic
importance.

The evidence of our study are important because of the costs associated with the
regulation of financial reporting and with firm disclosure. Our results on the
relationship between firm incentives, mandatory accounting standards and firms’
actual disclosures extend our understanding of how the financial reporting setting
and firm incentives influence practice. Questions have been raised about the global
application of IFRS and the effect of firm incentives and a country’s institutional
setting on the quality of reporting under IFRS (Christensen et al., 2008; ESMA,
2011; SEC 2011). Our study is relevant to this debate and provides insights that may
be useful for parties promulgating and enforcing accounting standards. It also
contributes to the evaluation of the benefits of IFRS in Australia. The findings are
relevant to countries engaged in or considering adoption of IFRS as regulators
determine the extent to which mandatory disclosure requirements are necessary and
useful.
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2.

Background and research predictions

2.1 Incentives for disclosure
There are many institutional factors that could affect firms’ disclosures about the
impact of IFRS for Australian firms. Mandatory standards (including AASB 1047
and AASB 101) promote disclosure about IFRS as firms seek to meet their
compliance obligations. In addition, IFRS adoption was considered a major event in
corporate Australia, promoting activity by preparers, auditors and market regulators
(i.e., the ASX and ASIC) (Picker, 2006). The combined effect of mandatory
standards and the scrutiny of auditors and regulators can be expected to promote
compliance with accounting standards and disclosure requirements.
While disclosure about the impact of IFRS was mandatory, many aspects of firms’
disclosure remain discretionary. That is, firms have some degree of control over
content and attributes of disclosure (i.e., amount, spread and type) as well as its
timing. In addition, firms have some choice in channel of disclosure, for example, via
earnings forecasts, earnings announcements, statutory financial statements, investor
presentations and press releases. Given that managerial incentives may affect firms’
disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001) we expect variation between firms in the content
and timing of their IFRS disclosures and the use of different channels for such
disclosure. Holland (1998; 2005) proposes that changes in financial data in firm
accounts create a setting where firms have strong incentives (linked to the share price
effects of information and consequently cost of capital) to provide information to
prevent ‘earnings surprises’. He argues that the magnitude of a change is important,
not its direction. A change such as IFRS adoption creates uncertainty with regards to
the impact on financial accounts and managers are likely to explain away this
uncertainty.
However markets are generally more sensitive to ‘bad news’ compared to ‘good
news’. Firms are cautious when reporting earnings downgrades and losses because of
the implications for analyst forecasts, future performance and consequent impact on
share price (Graham et al. 2005). Studies have shown poor performance brings about
more detailed explanations (Bloomfield 2008), longer conference calls to analysts
(Matsumoto et al. 2011) and increase in the content of management discussion and
5

analysis reports (Brown and Tucker 2010). Consistent with disclosure being
important to external users, Barton and Mercer (2005) show the plausibility of firm
explanations for poor performance affects judgements by analysts about future firm
performance. Other studies report earlier disclosure of bad news, possibly to reduce
litigation risk (Skinner 1994, 1997; Soffer et al. 2000; Kothari et al. 2009).
Thus we propose that firms’ narrative disclosures about the impact of IFRS are
linked to the adverse effect of IFRS adoption on the financial accounts (specifically,
measures of earnings and book value of equity). Firms experiencing an adverse
change have greater incentive to provide more explanation of the change, to ensure
that capital market participants are fully informed about the reasons for the change so
that their assessments of current position and performance and future prospects are
accurate. IFRS effects may be observed in both earnings and equity (in the latter,
through the flow of current earnings to retained earnings and directly through
changes in measurement of assets and liabilities). We expect firms to focus on
disclosure about adverse (i.e., downwards or negative) changes in earnings due to the
primacy of reported earnings. We also expect more disclosure about adverse changes
in book value of equity because equity values carry forward into the following year
and form part of key performance ratios such as return on equity. However, an
important aspect of our investigation is that the change in earnings at transition to
IFRS is a book entry (i.e., a change from alteration to accounting recognition and
measurement rules) not a change reflecting performance (i.e., a change in underlying
firm economics).

Similarly, we propose earlier disclosure of IFRS effects for firms experiencing
greater adverse IFRS financial impact. Early release of information will give market
participants more time to absorb the information and avoid misunderstandings. This
view is consistent with Grossman (1981) who argues that, to avoid the costs of
adverse selection, all firms are expected to disclose information as quickly as
possible. Diamond’s (1985) proposition that firms adopt disclosure policies that
result in private information search savings also fits with the argument that firms
with the most to lose from non-disclosure (in our case, from investors misinterpreting
the financial impact of IFRS) will make earlier disclosures, for example in their IFRS
transition year rather than the adoption year.
6

2.2. Multiple disclosure media
Prior studies of Australian firms’ IFRS transition disclosure show disclosure varies
with firm attributes and incentives. Using a sample of 150 firms, Palmer (2008)
reports more transition disclosure by larger firms, those with more leverage and firms
audited by a Big 4 auditor. Gallery et al. (2008) extends the work of Palmer by
considering a larger sample of 408 firms and using a detailed disclosure checklist
(with a score range of 1-17) that measures quality of disclosure in the transition
reconciliation statement and the accompanying narrative disclosure. The authors find
the quality of disclosure is negatively associated with IFRS impact on profit and
positively associated with firm size and change in profitability. The authors report
that disclosure quality varies between industries and clients of Big 4 audit firms.
Kent and Stewart (2008) use sentence counts to measure disclosure for 965 firms.
They argue that measures of the quantity of disclosure proxy for more detailed and
thus more transparent disclosure. The authors conclude that IFRS transition
disclosure is positively related to corporate governance indicators such as the number
of board and audit committee meetings and choice of a Big 4 auditor.

Because statutory financial statements are not a timely medium for reporting
information (Ball and Brown 1968), some firms will make disclosure through other
media to ensure information is communicated effectively (Gibbins et al. 1990,
Holland 1998; 2005). Continuing our arguments above, we expect that firms
experiencing greater adverse IFRS impact to use more communication channels and
provide more disclosure to achieve greater transparency about the effect of transition
to IFRS. When discussing mandatory reporting practices, corporate preparers have
indicated that the statutory disclosures are finalised, approved by the board and
audited. Firm announcements and investor presentations are then prepared, based on
material in the statutory accounts (Tarca et al. 2011). Therefore we expect disclosure
in firm announcements to complement (rather than substitute for) disclosure in the
financial statements.1
The way security analysts use firms’ releases also suggests a complementary relationship. Anecdotal
evidence indicates that analysts initially extract information from earnings announcements and
investor presentations, later supplementing this with material taken from the statutory financial
statements, reflecting the timing of release of the documents.
1
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2.3 Value relevance of IFRS transition disclosure
Several studies consider the financial impact of the transition from national GAAP to
IFRS and whether the use of IFRS improves value relevance of numbers in the
statutory accounts. Prior to its adoption, some held the view that IFRS transition
disclosure would provide no additional information so capital market effects would
be negligible (Horton and Serafeim 2009). On the other hand, survey evidence
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006; KPMG 2005) suggests that mandatory IFRS
disclosure will have capital market effects because investors perceive an increase in
the quality of management information, improvement in corporate transparency and
enhanced comparability between jurisdictions and industry sectors.

Hung and Subramanyan (2007) find that on transition to international standards
reconciliation information about changes in equity in German firms is value relevant
while information about changes in earnings is not. In contrast, Horton and Serafeim
(2009) report that changes in earnings on transition are value relevant for UK firms.
Barth et al. (2011) who find differences in value relevance of transition
reconciliations between three country groupings based on legal system (English,
French/German and Scandinavian) as well as industry sector (financial and nonfinancial). Christensen et al. (2009) suggest that IFRS transition can have economic
effects if the restated numbers have implications for breaching debt covenants. The
authors find larger reactions to earnings reconciliations from UK GAAP to IFRS for
firms with a greater likelihood of covenant violations.

Some evidence suggests that IFRS reconciliation disclosures do not contain new
information in relation to Australian firms, possibly because of the relatively high
level of harmonisation of Australian GAAP (AGAAP) and IFRS before adoption
(Picker, 2006). Goodwin et al. (2008) study 1,065 Australian firms and report that
IFRS earnings and book values are not more value relevant than AGAAP measures
even though firms experienced, on average, a reduction in earnings when they
transitioned from AGAAP to IFRS. Similarly, Becis et al. (2007) do not find a
market reaction to the release of reconciliation information for large Australian firms.
Clarkson et al. (2011) find no change in the value relevance of book value and
earnings for prices before and after mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 for firms in the
8

European Union and Australia. However, considering a longer time period (19902008) Chalmers et al. (2011) find an improvement in value relevance of earnings, but
not book value of equity following IFRS adoption, for their sample of mainly
industrial firms.

It may be that managers do not consider the IFRS transition amounts to have
information content and thus do not expend special effort explaining the change
beyond that required to satisfy mandatory disclosure standards. Therefore we
investigate the relevance of IFRS impact disclosure by considering first, whether
firms’ reported changes in earnings and equity on transition to IFRS are value
relevant and, second, whether the narrative disclosure about IFRS impact (i.e.,
explanations of the impact of IFRS on earnings and equity at transition) contributes
to higher value relevance.

3.

Design, sample and data

3.1 Sample selection
The Australian setting is appropriate for this study for several reasons. The domestic
capital market, although relatively small, is highly developed with sophisticated
participants and information exchange mechanisms. External sources of finance are
important and the quality of firms’ disclosures and communication with outsiders
attracts a great deal of attention, both within firms and in the public domain. In
Australia, IFRS adoption was mandatory for all reporting entities for financial years
commencing 1 January 2005 and early adoption was not permitted. Sample firms
were selected from the S&P ASX 200. Firms were required to be followed by at least
three analysts (to include firms for which public disclosures are important) and to use
AGAAP then IFRS. This reduced the sample to 150 and reflects the extent of analyst
following of Australian firms.

Our sample is smaller than that used by Gallery et al. (2008) and Kent and Stewart
(2008) but consistent with that of Palmer (2008), who argues that 150 firms are
sufficient for robust statistical testing. In addition, our sample represents
approximately 80% of the capitalisation of the Australian market, thus includes the
most economically important firms. Three financial years are included: prior to IFRS
adoption; when IFRS comparative data was prepared; and first year of full IFRS
9

adoption (hereafter pre-transition, transition and adoption).2 Financial statements
were obtained from the Connect 4 database and firm announcements from the
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).

3.2 Measurement of IFRS disclosure
We measured the extent of disclosures about the effect of IFRS adoption in firms’
statutory annual financial statements during the three financial years and in firm
announcements to the ASX during 2005 and 2006.3 In the two years prior to
adoption, AASB 1047 Disclosing the Impacts of Adopting Australian Equivalents to
International Financial Reporting Standards required firms to explain (a) how the
transition to IFRS was managed and (b) the key differences in accounting policies
arising from IFRS adoption (paragraph 4.1). In the adoption year AASB 101 First
Time Adoption of Australian Equivalents to IFRS applied.4 Firms were required to
explain how the transition from previous GAAP to IFRS affected reported position,
performance and cash flows (paragraph 38). In addition, firms were required to meet
continuous disclosure obligations under Corporations Law and the need to report any
material changes in financial performance or position from IFRS was emphasised
(ASIC 2004).

Researchers commonly use word or sentence counts to measure disclosure (Beattie et
al. 2004). However, measures of magnitude are limited in what they can reveal about
the nature of the underlying disclosure. We follow the approach of Palmer (2008)
and Gallery et al. (2008) by using a self-constructed checklist to measure financial
2

The majority of firms have a 30 June year end (102 firms, 68%) so the years in the study end 30 June
2004, 2005 and 2006. However, 27 firms (18%) have a December year end and 21 (14%) have
another date for their financial year end. In these cases, years included vary to reflect financial year
end dates. Earliest years are December 2003 – December 2005 and latest years are November 2004 –
November 2006.
3
Due to the intensive and time consuming nature of data collection, we selected specific disclosure
documents for our study. We chose annual statutory financial statements as they are arguably the most
important information releases made by a firm. Due to resource constraints, we did not code
disclosures in half-yearly statutory financial statements in 2004-2006 or firm announcements in 2004.
We justify not including the interim reports for the following reasons. First, interim reports are not
provided to shareholders and therefore are distributed less widely than annual reports. Second, interim
reports are not audited and only reflect an interim position. Third, a review of interim reports of some
of the sample companies suggested that interim reports were not greatly used to convey IFRS
information.
4
Equivalent to IAS 1. Australian accounting standards (AASB) are based word-for-word on IAS and
IFRS issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) with additional paragraphs
added by the Australian Accounting Standards Board in relation to requirements for not-for-profit and
public sector entities.
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statement disclosure about IFRS effects. However, our checklist is more
comprehensive than those used in the two prior studies. It has 11 categories,
organised in three groups. They are: (A) Financial Performance #1 Revenue, #2
Expenses, #3 - #4 Profit; (B) Financial Position #5 Assets, #6 Liabilities, #7 Equity,
#8 Total figures; and (C) IFRS comments #9 Impact, #10 Volatility, #11 Other.
Following Beattie et al. (2002; 2004) we consider three attributes of disclosure. We
measure amount of disclosure by recording all items relating to IFRS impact in the
relevant documents, spread of disclosure by using the three groups A, B and C above
and type of disclosure by recording whether a disclosure item was qualitative or
quantitative.

Based on the financial statement checklist (Appendix 1), a firm received one point
each time a checklist item was discussed, that is, scores greater than one are possible
for each item and the checklist has no maximum score. A firm was awarded one
point for a qualitative disclosure with an additional one point for providing
quantitative disclosure as well. Qualitative disclosures related to descriptive
statements of fact or statements based on matters of judgement that did not include
numerical estimation. Quantitative disclosures on the other hand referred to narrative
disclosures that were supported by factual statements and numerical measurements.
Two coders, trained by the researchers, read all documents separately, recorded data
to checklists, then compared their coding to each other’s and reconciled any
differences to improve reliability in the coding process (Behn et al. 2001).

For firm announcements, we collected all documents lodged with the ASX in 2005
and 2006.5 They were searched for mention of IFRS, then checked for usable content
(e.g., IFRS discussion, not just the word IFRS). Disclosure in firm announcements
was coded based on a simplified version of the checklist used to measure financial
statement disclosure (Appendix 2). Since detailed information was already captured
5

For example, for firms with a 31 December year end (the earliest Australian firms to adopt IFRS),
announcements about full year results from transition year (i.e., FYE 31 December 2004) would
appear from approximately February 2005. For firms with 30 June year ends, announcements about
full year transition year results would appear from approximately August 2005. We expect most
discussion of impact of adoption in the full year results announcements for the transition year, that is,
when the financial impact is quantified and transition to IFRS balances are known. The applicable
dates would begin February 2006 for 31 December year end firms and August 2006 for 30 June year
end firms. We have not included 2004 as these announcements would mainly discuss results from the
prior year 2003, which is outside our period of interest.
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in the financial statements, the aim when coding these firm announcements was to
record any additional information provided.

In relation to the income statement, firms received one point for discussion of one
element of the income statement and an additional point for discussion of one or
more elements; one point if overall impact was discussed and another point if impact
was quantified (consistent with Palmer (2008) who argues that quantification
increases the quality of the disclosure); one point if impact for one or more segments
was discussed and another point if an alternative income measure (i.e., a non-GAAP
or proforma income measure) was discussed; one point if overall ratios were
discussed and up to two more points if one or more individual ratios were discussed.
One more point was given if ratios relating to segments were discussed. A similar
approach was followed for coding discussion of balance sheet information. In
addition, comments about IFRS were scored, with up to two points given for
discussion relating to each of the following: overall impact, volatility; other IFRS
comments; alternative measures; and the ‘standard’ IFRS comment.6

3.3 Models
The following models are used to investigate whether firms’ IFRS disclosures are
related to the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings and equity.
Discls   0  1EarnTA   2 EquityTA   3EarnTT   4 EquityTT   5 Adopt
 6Transit   7 Size   8 Analysts   9 Leverage
10 Loss  11Issues  12 Finance  13 Mining  14 ForList  

Eq (1)
where
Discls

= the measure of disclosure (including amount, spread and type) about
the impact of IFRS adoption in either of two media (annual statutory
financial statements and firm announcements);

EarnTA

= the change in IFRS earnings in adoption year scaled by total assets at
year end;

The ‘standard’ IFRS comment was a statement commonly included, stating that while IFRS adoption
changed financial measures it did not change the firm’s underlying economics.
6
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EquityTA = the change in IFRS equity in the adoption year scaled by total assets
at year end;

EarnTT

= the difference between IFRS and AGAAP earnings at transition date
scaled by total assets at transition;

EquityTT = the difference between IFRS and AGAAP equity at transition date
scaled by total assets at transition;
Adopt

= a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn
from the adoption year, and 0 otherwise;

Transit

= a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn
from the transition year, and 0 otherwise;

Size

= the natural logarithm of the firm’s total market capitalization at the
end of financial year t;

Analysts

= the number of analysts following the firm;

Leverage

= total leverage divided by total assets at end of financial year t;

Loss

= a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm reported a loss in
year t, and 0 otherwise;

Issues

= is the ratio of total proceeds the firm raised from equity to market
value of equity;

Finance

= a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is in the financial
services sector, and 0 otherwise;

Mining

= a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is in the mining
sector, and 0 otherwise; and

ForList

= a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is traded on a
regulated foreign exchange and 0 otherwise.

The regression model, based on Brown et al. (1999), is estimated using pooled data
and fitted with various measures of disclosure as the dependent variable. The
measures of disclosure include total disclosure, disclosure about financial position,
financial performance, quantitative and qualitative disclosure, and disclosure about
key items expected to be most affected by IFRS and IFRS comments disclosure. We
include robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity in the residuals.
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We measure the financial impact of adoption of IFRS using the following variables.

EarnTA and EquityTA measure the change in earnings and book value of equity in
the adoption year and EarnsTT and EquityTT measure the change arising on
transition from AGAAP to IFRS. Specifically, EarnTA (EquityTA) is the change in
IFRS earnings (book value of equity) in the adoption year, divided by total assets at
year end to control for size differences between firms (Equation 2). EarnTT
(EquityTT) is the difference between IFRS earnings (book value of equity) and
AGAAP earnings (book value of equity) at the date of transition, scaled by total
assets at year end (Equation 3). Our variable definition is consistent with Gallery et
al. (2008) and similar to other studies using transition adjustments (Hung and
Subramanyan 2007; Clarkson et al. 2011; Barth et al. 2011) where various deflators
have been used.7

EarnTA 

EarnTT 

 Earn

IFRS _ Adoption

 EarnIFRS _ Transition 

Total _ assets Adoption

 Earn

IFRS _ Transition

 EarnAGAAP _ Transition 

Total _ assetsTransition

…Eq (2)

…Eq (3)


A positive value for EarnsTA means IFRS earnings increased in the adoption year
while a positive value for EarnsTT means IFRS earnings is greater than AGAAP
earnings at transition. Consistent with Gallery et al. (2008), we predict a negative
relationship between changes in earnings and equity at transition with IFRS
disclosure. That is, firms experiencing a greater adverse change in earnings and
equity on transition to IFRS are more likely to provide more disclosure.8

We include the year dummy variables (Adopt, Transit) to detect changes in
disclosure across the years (consistent with Brown et al. 1999). We predict positive
coefficients for the dummy variables as we expect disclosure to increase over the
7

Horton and Serafeim (2009) calculate the difference between GAAP and IFRS earnings and equity at
transition and deflate the earnings change by GAAP earnings and the equity change by book value of
equity. In robustness tests, we re-run all our models with EarnTT andEquityTT deflated by book
value of equity instead of total assets. The results for these models are qualitatively similar to those
reported elsewhere in our study.
8
The directional relationship of the IFRS impact variables and the disclosure variables reflects the
way IFRS impact is defined. Thus a negative coefficient indicates that, as positive numbers become
smaller and negative numbers become larger, firms are more likely to provide greater disclosure.
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period as firms become more certain of IFRS effects. There is an extensive disclosure
literature that reports more disclosure by larger firms and those followed by more
analysts (see for example, Craswell and Taylor 1992; Hossain and Adams 1995;
Lang and Lundholm 1996; Brown et al. 1999). In addition, firms raising capital and
with foreign exchange listings provide more disclosure (Hossain and Adams 1995;
Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995). Leverage may also be associated with disclosure
(Christensen et al. 2009). Thus we include control variables for size (Size), number of
analysts following the firm (Analysts), leverage (Leverage), capital raising (Issues)
and foreign listing (ForList).9 Because Gallery et al. (2008) suggest firms
experiencing unexpected changes in earnings and losses provide more disclosure, we
include a loss dummy variable (Loss). In our models changes in earnings is captured
in the EarnTA variable.

Two industry dummy variables are included (Finance, Mining) because IFRS
adoption (particularly IAS 39) may affect the results of firms in the financial sector
and mining sector more than other firms (Goodwin et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011).10
Prior studies investigating transition disclosure and industry effects report mixed
results. Kent and Stewart (2008) find an association between disclosure and being a
firm in the finance or mining sector while Gallery et al. (2008) and Palmer (2008)
find no such association.11

Finally, to explore the relevance of disclosure about IFRS impact, we use the price
level model adopted in prior studies (Barth and Clinch 1998; Goodwin et al. 2008;
Chalmers et al. 2011), derived from Ohlson (1995).
'
'
Price   0  1 BVE   2 NI   3EarnTT
  4 EquityTT


9

…(Eq 4)

We have not included corporate governance variables as corporate governance is a complex concept
not easily proxied by individual corporate governance variables (such as having a non-executive chair,
proportion of independent directors or the number of meetings). To extend the work of Kent and
Stewart (2008) would require identifying better proxies for corporate governance, which we
considered beyond the scope of our paper.
10
Type of auditor is an important explanatory variable for disclosure in Gallery et al. (2008), Kent and
Stewart (2008) and Palmer (2008). However, we do not include a variable representing type of audit
firm as only six of the sample companies are not audited by a Big 4 firm.
11
In Palmer’s (2008) study, mining firms are included in the materials sector.
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where
Price

= a firm’s share price three months after end of year t;

BVE

= book value of equity per share, at year end t;

NI

= earnings per share, for year t;

'
EarnTT

= the difference between IFRS and AGAAP earnings at transition date,
divided by number of shares;

'
 EquityTT
= the difference between IFRS and AGAAP equity at transition date,

divided by number of shares.

The model tests the value relevance of accounting data by exploring the relationship
of price, book value of equity and earnings (deflated by number of shares to control
for scale effects).12 Based on prior research, we predict book value of equity and
earnings to be relevant to share price, and expect positive coefficients on BVE and
NI. Consistent with Hung and Subramanyan (2007), Goodwin et al. (2008) and Barth
et al. (2011), we add variables to measure the financial effect of adoption of IFRS
(the difference between measures of earnings and equity under AGAAP and IFRS, in
'
'
'
our case EarnTT
and EquityTT
). Significant positive coefficients on EarnTT
, and
'
EquityTT
suggest that the amount of the change from AGAAP to IFRS is value

relevant.
We also consider the relevance of transition disclosure by identifying ‘high
disclosing’ firms, using two approaches. In our primary tests, we identify high
disclosing firms using the fitted models (Equation 1) of disclosure in (a) the financial
statements and (b) firm announcements respectively. For each of the two models, we
create two groups based on whether the firm-year observation has a positive or
negative residual. Firm-year observations with positive residuals are identified as
having higher than expected disclosures and those with negative residuals are
identified as having lower than expected disclosures. Positive coefficients for
'
'
EarnTT
, or EquityTT in models for the high disclosing group shows that IFRS

impact disclosure has assisted market participants to interpret the transition
12

In Equation (4) all variables are scaled by number of shares, to control for heteroscedasticity in the
levels model (Goodwin et al. 2008). In Equation (1) EarnTT and EquityTT are scaled by total assets
to control for differences in size between firms.
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reconciliation amounts. In robustness tests, instead of the residuals we use firms’
scores for total disclosure (Discls) in (a) the financial statements and (b) firm
announcements to form the subgroups.

4.

Results

4.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 (Panel A) shows a seven-fold increase in total amount of IFRS impact
disclosure (TotalFS) over the three years, from an average total score of 14 in the pretransition year to 100 in the adoption year. In all years, firms on average provide
more disclosure about financial position (PositionFS), suggesting that explaining
asset, liability and equity effects is relatively more important to firms. In the adoption
year mean PositionFS score is 74 while the mean total disclosure (TotalFS) score is
100 (Panel C).

Firms on average provide more qualitative disclosures in all three years examined,
with differences in the amount of qualitative and quantitative disclosures narrowing
over the period. In the pre-transition year, mean qualitative disclosure is 14
(compared to mean TotalFS of 14) and in the adoption year it is 57 (compared to
mean TotalFS of 100). The proportions are not surprising because firms are required
to state their financial performance and position figures under IFRS for financial
years beginning 1 January 2005 while they were only required to discuss the impact
of the IFRS in the prior years. Also, firms could be more specific as more
information was revealed with the passage of time. Mean disclosure about key items
affected by IFRS KeyItemsFS (as per AASB 1047) increases from 4 (28% of total
disclosure) in pre-transition to 20 (20%) in adoption year. The proportions suggest
that a large amount of discussion is not about key items, raising questions about its
relevance.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

In relation to disclosure scores in firm announcements about IFRS effects, there were
338 announcements in 2005 and 328 in 2006. On average, firms provided two public
announcements in both the transition and adoption years however one firm provided
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19 announcements in the transition year and another 17 in the adoption year (Table
2). The average timing of announcements (Lag) was 71 days after year end in the
transition year and 84 days in the adoption year. The minimum time to release was
23 days and the maximum 238 days in the adoption year compared to 25 days and
162 days in the transition year. Considering the mean and maximum number of days,
firms made their announcements earlier in the transition year.
For most firms, discussion of IFRS impact was included in the firm’s half-year
results announcement or the preliminary financial statements issued after financial
year end. Untabulated data show that of the 666 announcements we coded in 20052006, 21% were announcements made on or near the release of the half-yearly results
and 55% were made on or near the release of the full year preliminary financial
statements (within a three day window). Only 29 announcements were stand-alone
IFRS statements. They were released by 22 large firms, of which 10 were from the
financial services sector. Of the 29, only 12 announcements were released on a day
other than when the half-year or yearly results were released. On average, these 12
documents were lodged 35 days after the nearest financial period end. Thus, we
conclude that firms were most likely to discuss the effects of IFRS adoption within
their period-end disclosures. Separate documents and documents released prior to
end of the financial period were rare.

Table 2 shows the mean TotalCA disclosure is higher in transition year compared to
adoption (11 compared to 7). Similar to financial statement disclosure, the proportion
of qualitative disclosure is lower in the adoption year (7 qualitative versus 2
quantitative in the transition year; 3 qualitative versus 2 quantitative in the adoption
year). Mean scores for PerformCA and PositionCA are similar within and between
years. However, the range of scores is high, with TotalCA disclosure scores reaching a
maximum of 81 in the transition year and 94 in the adoption year. In the subcategories of disclosure, one firm recorded the maximum score of 43 for IFRS
comments (CommentsCA) in transition year and another recorded the maximum score
of 47 for PerformCA disclosure in adoption year.

[Insert Table 2 about here]
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The summary statistics for the independent variables are provided in Table 3.13 The
sample includes the largest Australian firms, with average market capitalization of
AUD 2.0 billion at the transition year end. Firms vary in size from AUD 120.8
million to AUD 109.9 billion (Std. dev = 13.18 billion) indicating the sample
includes a range of firms based on size. They are, on average, covered by seven
analysts. Mean leverage is 53% and, on average, capital raising represents 4.9% of
market value of equity in the period. The sample included 93 firm-years (20.7%)
from the financial services sector and 45 firm-years (10%) from the mining sector.
Forty-five firms are cross-listed or traded on a foreign stock exchange and 26 firmyears (5.8%) incurred a loss in the study period.

For the transition year (AGAAP to IFRS), firms, on average, restated their equity at a
lower value (∆EquityTT = -0.032) and their earnings at a higher value (∆EarnTT =
0.004). In the adoption year, based on opening and closing IFRS balances, firms
experienced a mean increase in equity (∆EquityTA = 0.078) and earnings (∆EarnTA =
0.012).

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Table 4 shows significant correlations between the various measures of disclosure.
Not surprisingly, measures of financial statement disclosure about IFRS impact on
position and performance (PerformFS, PositionFS) are positively correlated with total
disclosure (TotalFS) (0.79; 0.99) and with each other (0.71). Similarly, IFRS impact
disclosure in firm announcements about position and performance (PerformCA,
PositionCA) are positively correlated with total disclosure (TotalCA) (0.93; 0.92) and
with each other (0.78). Scores for financial statement disclosure and firm
announcement disclosure are significantly positively correlated (0.34) but the level is
relatively low.

The total disclosure scores from financial statements (firm announcements) are
significantly and positively correlated with firm size at 0.42 (0.50), analyst following
0.20 (0.38) and leverage 0.43 (0.34). Thus larger firms and those with more analyst
13

The independent variables were examined for outliers and extreme values are winsorised at three
standard deviations.
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following provide greater disclosure and the relationship is stronger for disclosure in
firm announcements. Disclosure scores (in total and for position and performance)
are generally not significantly correlated with the change in earnings and equity
variables, suggesting a lack of association between amount of disclosure and IFRS
impact. Significant negative correlations are observed between TotalFS, PerformFS,
PositionFS and ∆EarnTA (-0.13, -0.13 and -0.12) and ∆EquityTA (-0.14, -0.10 and 0.14). A negative correlation suggests more disclosure by firms with smaller changes
in earnings and equity. No significant correlations are observed between the variables
capturing firm announcement disclosure (i.e., TotalCA, PerformCA and PositionCA) and
the variables measuring IFRS impact (i.e., ∆EarnTT , ∆EquityTT , ∆EarnTA and
∆EquityTA).

[Insert Table 4 about here]

4.2 Regression results
Table 5 presents the pooled model and models for ‘good news’ (∆EarnTA > 0) and
‘bad news’ (∆EarnTA < 0) firms in Panel A. The transition and adoption year models
are presented in Panel B. The models include financial statement disclosure about
IFRS impact (TotalFS) as the dependent variable, four measures of the IFRS financial
impact (∆EquityTA, ∆EarnTA, ∆EquityTT and ∆EarnTT) and control variables. Table 6
presents the same models but with total disclosure in firm announcements (TotalCA)
as the dependent variable.14

4.2.1 IFRS financial impact and disclosure
In the pooled model (Table 5, Panel A) coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are
negative and significant (-2.174, p<0.05 and -0.820, p<0.05), suggesting disclosure is
higher for firms with a smaller change. That is, firms with more adverse (less
positive) financial impact are likely to provide more disclosure compared to firms
with less adverse (more positive) financial impact. We observe a similar pattern for
disclosure in the firm announcements. In the pooled model (Table 6, Panel A)
coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are negative and significant (-0.305, p<0.10
and -0.214, p<0.01).
14

All dependent variables are scaled by dividing by 100 to reduce the size of the coefficients on the
independent variables.
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[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]

In addition, we find the relationship of IFRS impact and disclosure is observed in the
adoption year for financial statements and the transition year for firm
announcements. Coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are negative and significant in
the adoption year (-6.364, p<0.01; -2.334, p<0.01) for financial statement disclosure
(Table 5, Panel B). Table 6 (Panel B) shows that the relationship between disclosure
in firm announcements and IFRS financial impact occurs earlier, and in both the
transition and adoption years. Coefficients on ∆EquityTT and ∆EarnTA are negative
and significant (-0.198, p<0.05 and -0.340, p<0.01) in the transition year model and
∆EquityTA is negative and significant (-0.073, p<0.05) in the adoption year. This
result suggests that firm announcements are used to provide earlier communication
of IFRS information.
4.2.2 Disclosure by ‘bad news’ firms
To investigate the effect for firms experiencing a positive change (earnings
increases) compared with those experiencing a negative change (earnings decreases),
we split the sample based on positive (good news) or negative (bad news) values for
∆EarnTA.15 Table 5 (Panel A) shows a negative coefficient on ∆EarnTT (-5.444,
p<0.01) for bad news firms, thus supporting the prediction that firms with more
adverse (less positive) impact on earnings provide more disclosure. The prediction is
not supported in relation to changes in equity in the transition year: ∆EquityTT is
negative but not significant. This result is consistent with a focus on discussion of
earnings effects of IFRS. However, ∆EquityTA is negative and significant (-0.409,
p<0.05) indicating more disclosure about IFRS equity effects when equity declines in
the adoption year, consistent with the transition IFRS earnings effects carrying
forward to equity in the following year and requiring explanation.

This pattern is not observed for good news firms. The coefficients on the earnings
and equity variables at transition are not significant. However, ∆EarnTA is negative
15

We subdivide the sample into good and bad news firms, rather than include dummy variables for
good news and bad news firms in the full sample model because the subsample approach allows
variation in all variables included in the models, which permits us to better explore the relationship of
the experimental and control variables with disclosure.
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and significant (-1.144, p<0.10), indicating more disclosure by firms with a relatively
smaller increase in earnings in the adoption year. That is, for good news firms,
disclosure is decreasing with earnings impact. Firms with smaller increases in
earnings in the adoption year are more likely to discuss IFRS effects on earnings than
firms with larger increases in earnings. A possible interpretation of this result is that
firms with less good news arising from economic events (i.e., earnings increases due
to business performance) make more use of IFRS disclosure to explain their results.
This interpretation is consistent with what we observed for bad news firms, that is,
when earnings are negative or increases in earnings are relatively smaller, firms are
more likely to discuss IFRS effects. Stated another way, when economic
performance is stronger, the firm provides less discussion of the accounting effects of
IFRS.

In the models reported in Table 5, the coefficient signs on the control variables are as
expected. In the pooled model, the year dummies (Transit, Adopt) are positive and
significant, indicating that firms make more disclosure in both the transition and
adoption years, compared to the pre-transition year. We include additional variables
in our models to control for other factors that may influence the relationship between
disclosure and the financial impact of IFRS. We observe positive and significant
coefficients on variables for size, analyst following, leverage and being a financial
sector firm. These variables have been reported by Palmer (2008), Gallery et al.
(2008) and Kent and Stewart (2008) to be associated with higher levels of disclosure.

4.2.3 IFRS disclosure channels
The third prediction was that IFRS impact disclosures in firm announcements would
complement the disclosure in the financial statements and that firms would use both
the firm announcements and the financial statement disclosures to inform investors.
In the pooled model (Table 6, Panel A), the coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are
negative and significant (-0.305, p<0.10 and -0.214, p<0.01) consistent with the
results for financial statement disclosure (Model 5). However, when we consider the
‘good news’ and ‘bad news’ firms separately, we do not find a significant
relationship between disclosure and the financial impact variables for ‘bad news’
firms. Although we show above that the firms adversely affected by IFRS (i.e., ‘bad
news’ firms) provide more disclosure in the financial statements, we do not find
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these firms making greater use of the available additional communication channel
provided via firm announcements.

The significant variables observed in the pooled model (Table 6, Panel A) are
associated with the ‘good news’ firms. Coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are
negative and significant (-1.033, p<0.05 and -0.680, p<0.01), showing that disclosure
is decreasing in earnings impact. As shown above for financial statement disclosure,
disclosure in firm announcements is decreasing with earnings impact for ‘good news’
firms. That is, firms with smaller increases in earnings in the adoption year are more
likely to discuss IFRS effects on earnings than firms with larger increases in
earnings.

Looking more generally about the use of firm announcements, we observe that larger
firms, firms with higher leverage and those from the financial services sector have
higher levels of IFRS impact disclosure (Table 6). This applies to both ‘good’ and
‘bad news’ firms. In addition, firms in the latter group that issue equity or belong to
the mining sector are more likely to provide greater disclosure.

4.2.4 Robustness tests
In robustness tests (untabulated), we explored whether the models for total disclosure
in financial statements (Model 5) and in firm announcements (Table 6) were
sensitive to the measure of disclosure used. Using the checklist data, we calculated
measures based on subcategories of disclosure relating to impact on performance and
on position. We also measured quantitative disclosure and qualitative disclosure and
disclosure about the key financial statement items likely to be affected by IFRS. All
the models for financial statement disclosure yielded results consistent with those
reported for the pooled model with total disclosure as the dependent variable (Table
5, Panel A). That is, the coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are negative and
significant in all pooled models, irrespective of the measure of disclosure used,
indicating that, overall, disclosure is decreasing with IFRS impact on earnings.
Control variables were significant in the same pattern as reported in the pooled
models in Table 5.
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The results for robustness tests for models using disclosure in firm announcements
also provided results consistent with those for the pooled total disclosure model
(Table 6, Panel A). The coefficients on ∆EarnTA were negative and significant in all
pooled models, irrespective of the measure of disclosure. The coefficients for
∆EarnTT were negative and significant in the qualitative and quantitative disclosure
models, but not in the position and performance models. As for financial statement
disclosure, our results confirm that disclosure is decreasing with IFRS impact on
earnings. Control variables were similarly significant to those reported in the pooled
models in Table 5.
4.2.5 Value relevance – IFRS disclosure
Table 7 reports the results of models investigating the value relevance of the
financial impact on earnings and equity at transition from AGAAP to IFRS and
whether the value relevance of these transition amounts is affected by the
accompanying narrative disclosure about the impact of IFRS adoption. As discussed
above, prior evidence is mixed as to whether reconciliation amounts themselves are
value relevant, depending on firm attributes (such as their country of origin, size and
industry sector) and the individual reconciliation items investigated.

[Insert Table 7 about here]

Goodwin et al. (2008) report that changes in earnings and equity on transition are not
value relevant for Australian firms. Consistent with these authors, we do not observe
'
significant coefficients on EquityTT
in any of the years in the study period or on

'
EarnTT
in the pre-transition years. However, in contrast to Goodwin et al. (2008),
'
the coefficient on EarnTT
is positive and significant in the transition year (5.015,

p<0.10, Table 7, Column A).
Next we consider whether transition reconciliation amounts ( EquityTT
'

and

'
EarnTT
) are more value-relevant for firms providing relatively more discussion of

the transition amounts (i.e., more explanations about the financial impact of the
transition to IFRS). As explained previously, the two subgroups are based on whether
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a firm-year’s residual in Equation 1 is positive or negative. Firms in the positive
residual group provide relatively more disclosure than firms in the negative residual
'
group. Table 7 shows that the coefficient on EarnTT
is positive and significant

(8.89, p<0.05, Column B) in the transition year only for firms that provide more
'
financial statement disclosure about the financial impact of adoption. EarnTT
is

positive but not significant for the negative residuals group (Column C).
'
A similar result is observed for firm announcements. The coefficient on EarnTT
is

positive and significant (6.78, p<0.05, Panel D) in the transition year for firms
providing more disclosure about the financial impact of adoption in announcements.
'
Once again, EarnTT
is positive but not significant for the negative residuals group
'
(Column E). EquityTT
is not significant for either group.

In robustness tests (untabulated) we form groups based on firms’ total disclosure
score in (a) the financial statements and (b) firm announcements. We re-run the
models reported in Table 7, Columns B-E. Results are qualitatively similar to those
'
in Table 7 where EarnTT
is positive and significant for the positive residuals group

only. Based on the findings above, we conclude that firms’ narrative disclosures
explaining the financial impact of adoption of IFRS transition were useful to market
participants.

5.

Conclusions

We investigated the content, timing and relevance of Australian firms’ disclosure in
annual statutory financial statements and firm announcements to the stock exchange
about the impact of IFRS during a three year period surrounding adoption. Studies of
adoption of IFRS suggest that effects of the new standards vary between countries
and firms, reflecting both the regulatory setting in which financial reporting takes
places (particularly the extent of difference between national GAAP and IFRS and
the level of enforcement) and firm incentives that underlie their reporting choices and
communication decisions. The period of adoption of IFRS provided a setting where
we could explore how firms in a developed capital market with investor oriented
financial reporting communicated information about IFRS financial changes, given
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that the IFRS effects are largely accounting changes and not changes in underlying
economic fundamentals.

Overall, the results show firms are sensitive to the need to ensure reported financial
changes are understood by market participants, irrespective of the source of the
changes (i.e., an accounting change compared to an economic change). Some firms
used both financial statements and firm announcements to promote understanding of
the impact of IFRS on reported position and performance. In addition, they made use
of the relatively greater freedom of firm announcements (which are unaudited and do
not follow a legally specified format) to provide additional and earlier information.

Our findings suggest that communication about changes to reported earnings was a
priority, consistent with earnings being the metric of primary interest in capital
markets. In some ways this focus is surprising, as earnings changes on transition are
accounting changes (i.e., book entries only) and it is the IFRS impact on equity that
carries forward to future years and affects ratio calculations. We observe more
disclosure by firms experiencing an adverse change in earnings, consistent with firms
being more sensitive about possible misinterpretations of negative signals about
future earnings. We find more disclosure of IFRS accounting effects when economic
performance is weaker, consistent with poorer performing firms seeking to justify
their performance.

The results suggest that disclosure in financial statements and firm announcements
are complementary, with the latter providing additional information to supplement
disclosure in the financial statements. The timing of disclosure suggests that firms
may be less constrained in discussions in ASX announcements compared with the
statutory accounts. We generally examine the two channels separately and do not
explore the interrelationship between the two. However, this issue is worthy of
further investigation in future research. 16
Finally, we conclude that narrative transition disclosures were not just a ‘box ticking’
exercise. Narrative disclosures in both financial statements and firm announcements
16

We thank the anonymous reviewer for the suggestion for further research.
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were useful to market participants in understanding the impact of the financial effect
on transition. Thus, understanding the accounting impact of IFRS was likely to be
important for predicting future earnings. The impact of IFRS on the analysis of
company fundamentals is beyond the scope of this study but could be usefully
investigated in subsequent research.

A limitation of our study is the relatively small sample size, reflecting the size of the
Australian capital market. Due to the intensive nature of data collection, we include
only annual statutory financial statements and one source of public announcements
(those made to the stock exchange). While these are arguably the most important
disclosure media, there may be other disclosures made in the period not captured in
our study. Given our design, the results may not be generalizable to smaller firms or
to other jurisdictions. Our findings are based on manual coding of disclosure. Despite
controls over the coding process, measuring disclosure is a subjective process and
thus may be measured with error. Nevertheless, our study contributes to an
understanding of the impact of mandatory disclosure requirements and managerial
incentives on firms’ disclosure practices.
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Table 1 Summary statistics for disclosure scores
Mean

Median

Std

Min

Max

Panel A: Pre-transition (n=150)
PeformFS
3
PositionFS
8
CommentsFS
3
TotalFS
14
QualitativeFS
14
QuantitativeFS
0
KeyItemsFS
4

2
8
3
13
12
0
4

3
8
3
12
12
1
4

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

14
34
14
47
47
9
14

Panel B: Transition (n=150)
PeformFS
12
PositionFS
42
CommentsFS
6
TotalFS
60
QualitativeFS
38
QuantitativeFS
22
KeyItemsFS
12

10
34
6
48
32
18
10

9
36
3
45
25
21
10

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

44
211
18
248
137
111
55

Panel C: Adoption (n=150)
PeformFS
18
PositionFS
74
CommentsFS
8
TotalFS
100
QualitativeFS
57
QuantitativeFS
42
KeyItemsFS
20

15
60
8
84
47
36
17

13
59
3
69
39
32
14

0
0
0
3
2
0
0

61
354
17
417
233
184
97

This table reports the distribution of the disclosure scores calculated using the checklist in the
Appendix 1. Scores reflect one point for every time a checklist item is discussed by the firm
(qualitative disclosure) with an additional one point for providing quantitative disclosure as well in
the year end financial statements. Only disclosure about the impact of adoption of IFRS is coded.
PerformFS refers to disclosure about impact on financial performance, PositionFS refers to disclosure
about impact on financial position, and CommentsFS refers to the IFRS comments. TotalFS is total
amount of IFRS impact disclosure. QualitativeFS disclosures are descriptive statements of fact or
opinion that do not include numerical estimation. QuantitativeFS disclosures are narrative statements
that include numerical estimation. KeyItemsFS are IFRS impact disclosure in the financial statements
about key items (financial instruments, share-based payment, employee entitlements, impairment,
intangible assets and tax effects). Pre-transition is the financial year prior to IFRS adoption; Transition
is the financial year when IFRS comparative data was prepared and reported at financial year end;
Adoption is the first full year of IFRS adoption.
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Table 2 Summary statistics for firm announcements
N

Mean

Median

Std

Min

Max

Panel A: Transition
Number
Count
Lag
PerformCA
PositionCA
CommentsCA
QualitativeCA
QuantitativeCA
TotalCA

338
150
112
150
150
150
150
150
150

2
71
4
3
4
7
2
11

2
66
3
2
2
5
2
7

3
24
4
4
5
8
3
13

0
25
0
0
0
0
0
0

19
162
21
18
43
51
21
81

Panel B: Adoption
Number
Count
Lag
PerformCA
PositionCA
CommentsCA
QualitativeCA
QuantitativeCA
TotalCA

328
150
103
150
150
150
150
150
150

2
84
3
2
2
3
2
7

1
66
1
0
1
2
1
3

3
52
7
3
4
5
4
12

0
23
0
0
0
0
0
0

17
238
47
18
29
31
25
94

This table reports the distribution of the disclosure scores calculated using the checklist in the
Appendix 2. Scores reflect one point for every time a checklist item is discussed by the firm. Only
disclosure about the impact of adoption of IFRS is coded (excluding disclosure in the financial
statements, which is coded separately, see Table 1 and Appendix 1). Number is the number of firm
announcements in the year. Count is the number of firm announcements per firm. Lag is the number
of days between financial year end and announcement date (n < 150 because not all firms make
announcements). PerformCA refers to disclosure about impact on financial performance, PositionCA
refers to disclosure about impact on financial position, and CommentsCA refers to the IFRS comments.
QualitativeCA disclosures are descriptive statements of fact or opinion that do not include numerical
estimation. QuantitativeCA disclosures are narrative statements that include numerical estimation.
TotalCA is the total amount of IFRS impact disclosure. Transition is the financial year when IFRS
comparative data was prepared and reported at financial year end; Adoption is the first full year of
IFRS use.
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Table 3 Summary statistics for independent variables
n

Mean/Proportion

Median

Max

Min

Std

EarnTT
EquityTT
EarnTA
EquityTA
Size
Analyst
Leverage
Issues

146
146

0.004
-0.032

0.003
-0.013

0.056
0.200

-0.049
-0.267

0.015
0.067

146
146
450
450
450
450

0.012
0.078
21.357
7
0.533
0.049

0.007
0.043
21.153
7
0.512
0.003

0.175
0.787
25.882
11
1.463
4.029

-0.150
-0.430
18.457
2
0.050
-0.035

0.052
0.165
1.405
2.066
0.202
0.218

Loss
Finance
Mining
ForList

450
450
450
450

0.058
0.207
0.100
0.300

This table reports the distribution of the independent variables. EquityTT refers to the change in the
shareholders’ equity as at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the
change in the net profit after tax at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EquityTA
refers to the change in the reported shareholders’ equity between the transition and adoption years.
EarnTA refers to the change in the reported net profit after tax between the transition and adoption
years. The variable Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, Analysts refers to the
number of analysts following the firm, Leverage is the ratio of total liability to total assets and Issues
is the ratio of total proceeds from issues to market value of equity. Loss is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the firm has a negative net profit after tax, Finance (Mining) is an industry dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is in the financial services (Mining) sector, and 0 otherwise.
ForList is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is traded on a foreign exchange, and 0
otherwise.
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Table 4 Correlation table
TotalFS

PeformFS

PositionFS

TotalCA

PeformFS

0.794*

PositionFS

0.990*

0.708*

TotalCA

0.338*

0.178*

0.352*

PerformCA

0.344*

0.217*

0.353*

0.926*

PositionCA

0.292*

0.143*

0.307*

0.923*

EarnTT

-0.091

-0.112

-0.088

-0.017

PerformCA

PositionCA

EarnTT

EquityTT

EarnTA

EquityTA

0.012

0.026

0.024

-0.001

0.139*

-0.061

-0.043

-0.059

-0.148*

-0.064

-0.047

-0.054

0.076

-0.044

0.361*
0.102

0.033

0.061

0.075

0.046

EarnTA

-0.127*

-0.127*

-0.124*

EquityTA
Size

-0.141*

-0.103

-0.141*

-0.074

Analyst

Leverage

0.777*
-0.010

EquityTT

Size

0.422*

0.303*

0.418*

0.496*

0.458*

0.430*

-0.037

-0.023

Analyst

0.203*

0.144*

0.207*

0.383*

0.337*

0.375*

-0.126*

-0.136*

0.071

-0.031

0.573*

Leverage

0.428*

0.305*

0.431*

0.344*

0.329*

0.309*

-0.174*

0.079

-0.185*

-0.320*

0.317*

0.253*

Issues
0.021
0.004
0.022
0.050
0.052
0.070
0.006
-0.002
-0.004
0.027
-0.035
0.086
0.126*
PerformFS refers to disclosure about impact on financial performance, PositionFS refers to disclosure about impact on financial position, and TotalFS = total amount of IFRS
impact disclosure. PerformCA refers to disclosure about impact on financial performance, PositionCA refers to disclosure about impact on financial position, and TotalCA = total
amount of IFRS impact disclosure. EquityTT refers to the change in the shareholders’ equity as at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the
change in the net profit after tax at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EquityTA refers to the change in the reported shareholders’ equity between the
transition and adoption years. EarnTA refers to the change in the reported net profit after tax between the transition and adoption years. The variable Size is the natural
logarithm of the market capitalization, Analysts refers to the number of analysts following the firm, Leverage is the ratio of total liability to total assets and Issues is the ratio
of total proceeds from issues to market value of equity.
* indicates significance at 5% level.
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Table 5 Regression results – financial statement disclosure
All Observations
Expected
Variable
Sign
Coeff
t-stat
Panel A: Pooled across all years
EarnTT
-2.174 -1.877 **
EquityTT
0.321
1.091
EarnTA
-0.820 -2.184 **
EquityTA
-0.071 -0.691
Transit
+
0.423 11.717 ***
Adopt
+
0.812 15.123 ***
Size
+
0.088
4.127 ***
Analyst
+
0.016
1.405 *
Leverage
+
0.505
4.078 ***
Loss
+
-0.144 -2.316
Issues
+
0.028
0.549
Finance
+
0.092
1.391 *
Mining
+
-0.067 -1.050
ForList
+
-0.034 -0.659
Intercept
-2.036 -5.007 ***
Adj R2
F-statistic
N

Variable
Panel B: By years
EarnTT
EquityTT
EarnTA
EquityTA
Size
Analyst
Leverage
Loss
Issues
Finance
Mining
ForList
Intercept
Adj R2
F-statistic
N

0.487
30.608 ***
438

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

EarnTA ≥ 0
Coeff
-0.797
0.503
-1.144
0.028
0.388
0.750
0.065
0.030
0.472
-0.126
0.054
0.057
-0.026
-0.070
-1.604

EarnTA < 0

t-stat
-0.497
1.174
-1.572
0.226
8.457
10.009
2.321
1.792
3.020
-1.612
0.806
0.808
-0.273
-1.001
-3.081

*
***
***
**
**
***

***

0.442
16.243

Coeff
-5.444
-0.329
1.596
-0.409
0.475
0.922
0.107
-0.006
0.514
-0.197
-0.212
0.280
0.033
0.015
-2.257

t-stat
-2.579
-0.895
1.817
-2.000
7.883
11.142
3.343
-0.321
2.218
-1.530
-1.416
1.527
0.295
0.187
-3.704

***

**
***
***
***
**

*

***

0.572
***

270

16.947

***

168

Transition year
Coeff
t-stat

Adoption year
Coeff
t-stat

0.325
-0.022
-0.386
-0.170
0.118
0.004
0.533
-0.221
0.005
0.072
-0.108
-0.041
-2.194

-6.364
0.899
-2.334
-0.101
0.121
0.052
0.770
-0.263
0.350
0.201
-0.084
-0.031
-2.273

0.160
-0.041
-0.661
-0.940
3.413 ***
0.212
2.835 ***
-1.984
0.117
0.727
-0.916
-0.479
-3.295 ***

0.263
5.310 ***
146

-2.564
1.296
-2.360
-0.370
2.615
1.541
2.825
-1.750
0.994
1.307
-0.591
-0.266
-2.561

***
***
***
*
***

*

***

0.306
6.315 ***
146
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This table reports regression models estimated using equation (1) for financial statement disclosure scores in total.
Panel A reports the results for models using the pooled sample comprising observations from all years. Panel B
reports the results for the models for the transition and adoption years. EquityTA refers to the difference in the
reported shareholders’ equity between transition and adoption year. EarnTA is the difference in earnings between
transition and adoption year. EquityTT refers to the change in the shareholders’ equity as at the transition year end
as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the change in the net profit after tax at the transition year end as a
result of IFRS adoption. All independent variables (other than the intercept term) are predicted to have a positive
relationship with disclosure. Adopt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn from the
adoption year, and 0 otherwise. Transit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn from
the transition year, and 0 otherwise. The variable Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, Analysts
refers to the number of analysts following the firm, Leverage is the ratio of total liability to total assets and Issues is
the ratio of total proceeds from issues to market value of equity. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the firm has a negative net profit after tax and 0 otherwise, Finance (Mining) is an industry dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the firm is in the financial services (Mining) sector, and 0 otherwise. ForList is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is traded on a foreign exchange, and 0 otherwise.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a 1-tailed test when the predicted
direction is indicated and 2-tailed test otherwise.
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Table 6 Regression results – disclosure in firm announcements
All Observations
Expected
Variable
Sign
Coeff
t-stat
Panel A: Pooled across all years
EarnTT
-0.305 -0.909
EquityTT
-0.060 -0.838
EarnTA
-0.214 -2.194 ***
EquityTA
0.008 0.146
Adopt
+
-0.047 -3.614
Size
+
0.032 5.933 ***
Analyst
+
0.000 -0.038
Leverage
+
0.134 4.002 ***
Loss
+
-0.049 -3.518
Issues
+
-0.001 -0.100
Finance
+
0.070 3.156 ***
Mining
+
0.023 1.092
ForList
+
0.002 0.142
Intercept
-0.651 -6.090 ***
Adj R2
F-statistic
N

Variable
Panel B: By years
EarnTT
EquityTT
EarnTA
EquityTA
Size
Analyst
Leverage
Loss
Issues
Finance
Mining
ForList
Intercept
Adj R2
F-statistic
N

0.341
12.577 ***
292

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

EarnTA ≥ 0
Coeff
-1.033
-0.001
-0.680
0.012
-0.051
0.041
0.001
0.100
-0.057
-0.007
0.067
0.040
-0.008
-0.820

t-stat
-2.137
-0.009
-2.814
0.172
-2.511
4.765
0.197
2.511
-2.449
-0.477
2.583
1.265
-0.313
-4.774

**
***

***
***

***

***

EarnTA < 0
Coeff
0.104
0.033
0.127
-0.044
-0.049
0.025
-0.009
0.121
-0.038
0.105
0.063
0.083
0.018
-0.448

t-stat
0.191
0.261
0.502
-0.823
-2.949
3.995
-1.909
2.405
-1.574
1.860
1.700
2.236
0.876
-3.884

***
***
**
**
**
***

0.354
8.538 ***
180

0.327
5.156 ***
112

Transition Year
Coeff
t-stat

Adoption Year
Coeff
t-stat

-0.542
-0.198
-0.340
0.091
0.040
-0.003
0.163
-0.060
-0.004
0.069
0.040
-0.006
-0.833

-0.046
0.053
-0.084
-0.073
0.024
0.003
0.108
-0.049
0.022
0.068
0.007
0.009
-0.533

-1.233
-1.944
-2.523
1.043
6.107
-0.676
2.924
-2.793
-0.323
2.213
1.180
-0.246
-6.324

0.375
8.260 ***
146

**
***
***
***

**

***

-0.094
0.561
-0.587
-1.828
2.999
0.724
2.730
-2.240
0.517
2.094
0.276
0.355
-3.274

**
***
***

**

***

0.263
5.318 ***
146
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This table reports regression models estimated using equation (1) for firm announcement disclosure scores in total. 
Panel A reports the results for models using the pooled sample comprising observations from all years. Panel B
reports the results for the models for the transition and adoption years. EquityTA refers to the difference in the
reported shareholders’ equity between transition and adoption year. EarnTA is the difference in earnings between
transition and adoption year. EquityTT refers to the change in the shareholders’ equity as at the transition year end
as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the change in the net profit after tax at the transition year end as a
result of IFRS adoption. All independent variables (other than the intercept term) are predicted to have a positive
relationship with disclosure. Adopt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn from the
adoption year, and 0 otherwise. Transit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn from
the transition year, and 0 otherwise. The variable Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, Analysts
refers to the number of analysts following the firm, Leverage is the ratio of total liability to total assets and Issues is
the ratio of total proceeds from issues to market value of equity. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the firm has a negative net profit after tax and 0 otherwise, Finance (Mining) is an industry dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the firm is in the financial services (Mining) sector, and 0 otherwise. ForList is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is traded on a regulated US exchange, and 0 otherwise.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a 1-tailed test when the predicted
direction is indicated and 2-tailed test otherwise.
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Table 7 Regression results – disclosure effect in price regression models
Financial statements disclosure
Positive residuals
(B)
Coeff
t-stat

(A)
Coeff
BVE
NI
'
EarnTT
'
EquityTT
Intercept
Adj R2
N

t-stat

0.451 1.197
11.624 4.616
5.015 1.904
-0.480 -1.694
1.331 2.490
0.781
145

***
**
**
**

-0.309
16.432
8.888
-0.374
1.896

-0.412
3.781
2.305
-1.458
1.909
0.829
61

Company announcements disclosure

Negative residuals
(C)
Coeff
t-stat

***
**

*

0.936
7.975
9.560
-0.293
1.170

2.485
3.375
1.052
-0.353
1.826
0.723
84

**
***

*

Positive residuals
(D)
Coeff
t-stat

Negative residuals
(E)
Coeff
t-stat

-0.133
14.949
6.779
0.277
1.730

0.989
9.779
3.494
-0.901
0.844

-0.195
3.578
1.714
0.712
1.998
0.821
66

***
**

*

3.083
3.315
0.402
-1.251
0.937

***
***

0.752
79

The dependent variable is share price measured three months after year end. BVE is a firm’s book value of equity at year end. NI is net profit. EquityTT refers to the change in
shareholders’ equity at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the change in net profit after tax at the transition year end as a result of IFRS
adoption. All variables are deflated by number of shares at year end. Panel A shows models for the full sample. Panel B (Panel C) shows models for the subgroup of firms that
have positive (negative) residuals in the fitted Equation 1 when the dependent variable is total financial statement disclosure. Panel D (Panel E) shows models for the
subgroup of firms that have positive (negative) residuals in the fitted Equation 1 when the dependent variable is total firm announcement disclosure.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a 1-tailed test when the predicted direction is indicated and 2-tailed test otherwise.
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Appendix 1 Checklist: IFRS disclosure in the financial statements
Category

SubItem
item
Group A Financial performance
1
0
Revenue – total
2
0
Expenses – total
2
1
Share based compensation expense
2
2
Defined benefit plan expense (defined contribution, actuarial gain/loss)
2
3
Impairment
2
4
Amortisation
2
5
Depreciation
2
6
Leases expense
2
7
R&D expense
2
8
Administration and branch expenses
2
9
Foreign currency (gain)/loss
2
10
Financial instruments (gain)/loss
2
11
Cost of sales
2
12
Rental expense
2
13
Development expense
2
14
Restoration expense
2
16
Operating expense
2
17
Other expenses
3
1
Profit associates (equity accounting, income investments in associates)
3
2
Profit joint ventures
3
3
Operating profit before tax
3
4
Tax
3
5
Discontinued operations
3
6
Net profit after tax
4
1
EPS
4
2
ROE
Group B Financial position
5
0
Assets – total
5
1
Assets – financial instruments
5
2
Assets – defined benefit plan and employee share plan assets
5
3
Assets – intangibles, goodwill, R&D, E&E
6
0
Liabilities – total
6
1
Liabilities – financial instruments
6
2
Liabilities – defined benefit plan and employee share plan liabilities
7
0
Equity – total
7
1
Equity – foreign currency reserve
7
2
Equity – financial instruments reserve
7
3
Equity – retained earnings
8
1
Net Assets
8
2
Net Debt
8
3
Net Equity
Group C IFRS comments
9
0
Impact statements
10
0
Volatility statements
11
1
Plan
11
2
Process
11
3
Comparability (international)
11
4
External advice
11
5
Uncertainty
11
6
Miscellaneous
All items of disclosure in the relevant documents are scored as 1 on the checklist, thus providing a
measure of amount of disclosure, by category. Items scored 1 for qualitative disclosure with an
additional 1 for quantitative disclosure.
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Appendix 2 Checklist: IFRS disclosure in the firm announcements
Points
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Max = 10

1
1
1
1
1
1
Max = 6

Group A Financial performance
Discussion of
Overall impact (qualitative)
One element
Two or more elements
Quantify impact
Impact on segments
Proforma measures
Ratios overall
Ratios one element
Ratios two or more elements
Ratios segments
Group B Financial position
Discussion of
Overall impact (qualitative)
One element
Two or more elements
Quantify impact
Impact on segments
Proforma measures
Group C Comments impact of IFRS
Discussion of
Impact (qualitative)
Impact (quantitative)
Volatility (qualitative)
Volatility (quantitative)
Other (qualitative)
Other (quantitative)
IFRS comment
Alternative measures

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Max = 8
TOTAL = 24
All firm announcements lodged with the ASX containing information about the impact of IFRS
(excluding the financial statements) were coded using the above checklist. Firms were given one
point for each item in the checklist, to a maximum of 10 points for Group A (Financial Performance),
6 points for Group B (Financial Position) and 8 points for Group C (IFRS Comments) giving a
maximum overall score of 24.
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